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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
Is New York’s Mark-to-Market Act 
Unconstitutionally Retroactive?
by Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, David Gamage, Darien Shanske, and Kirk Stark
It is well known in tax literature that 
rudimentary tax planning strategies enable 
wealthy individuals to avoid state and federal 
income tax on much of their true economic 
income.1 Indeed, the existing income tax has been 
described as being effectively optional for those 
who derive their income chiefly from the 
ownership of assets rather than the provision of 
services.2 The reason is — except for a few 
relatively narrowly tailored deemed-realization 
rules3 — both state and federal income taxes rely 
on the realization principle. Under realization 
accounting, taxpayers generally do not owe tax on 
economic gains until they sell their appreciated 
assets. Moreover, this is so even when taxpayers 
fund lavish lifestyles by borrowing against their 
appreciated assets.
Legislation under consideration in New York 
would limit the ability of the state’s wealthiest 
taxpayers to escape tax in this manner. The 
Billionaire Mark-to-Market (MTM) Tax Act 
(S. 8277B/A. 10414) would require these taxpayers 
to reports gains and losses as they accrue, rather 
than upon sale or exchange as under current law.
Opponents claim that the MTM Act is 
unconstitutional. In a separate essay, we will 
explain why and how the New York Constitution 
authorizes accrual taxation through deemed 
realizations as in the MTM Act (and also as in a 
number of existing provisions of state income tax 
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In this installment of Academic Perspectives 
on SALT, the authors argue that if New York’s 
proposed Billionaire Mark-to-Market Tax Act is 
enacted, it should be upheld against any 
constitutional challenge based on retroactivity.
1
See, e.g., David Gamage and John R. Brooks, “Tax Now or Tax Never: 
Political Optionality and the Case for Current-Assessment Tax Reform” 
(unpublished draft manuscript on file with authors); Edward J. 
McCaffery, “A New Understanding of Tax,” 103 Mich. L. Rev. 807, 920 
(2005) (“Taxes on capital are easily avoided and virtually voluntary.”); C. 
Eugene Steuerle, “Individuals Pay Very Little Individual Income Tax on 





IRC sections 475, 877A, and 1256.
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law).4 Here, we evaluate the retroactivity concerns 
that the legislation’s opponents have raised.
On its face, the MTM Act is not retroactive. A 
retroactive tax can be understood as one that 
alters one’s liability for a tax year before 
enactment of the tax. For example, most would 
agree that if Congress enacted legislation in 2020 
requiring taxpayers to recalculate their 2015 
income tax liability with new higher rates, that 
measure would fit the common-sense definition 
of a retroactive tax. By contrast, the MTM Act 
would introduce a new method of income tax 
accounting for gains and losses for a small subset 
of wealthy New York taxpayers. It would apply a 
prospective tax at the regular state income tax rate 
on resident billionaires’ unrealized capital gains 
through a deemed sale mechanism. The act’s 
mark-to-market method of accounting is a well-
established approach in federal and New York 
income tax law for some types of taxpayers (for 
example, dealers in securities) and some types of 
financial instructions (for example, specific 
futures contracts). By extending the mark-to-
market accounting method to a new class of 
taxpayers, the MTM Act would apply more 
broadly than these features of existing law. The 
MTM Act would generate an estimated $23.3 
billion in additional state revenue in 2020, and 
another $1.2 billion in each subsequent year.
Three features of the MTM Act could raise 
retroactivity issues. First, there is a question 
whether the state can apply a deemed-sale 
mechanism going forward given that this 
mechanism would affect gains accrued before the 
current tax year. Second, the act would apply to all 
unrealized capital gains since a billionaire became 
a New York resident, so in the first year it could 
tax the accumulated gains of many past years. 
Third, the MTM Act defines state residency based 
on a billionaire being present in the state for 183 
days in 2020, and since we are now in February 
2021 (as of publication), billionaire taxpayers 
would likely have already satisfied the residency 
requirement based on their past presence in the 
state.
Do these provisions raise a federal or state 
constitutional issue? The MTM Act will likely be 
challenged in the courts, so it is important to 
resolve this question.
I. Analytic Frame
Before applying case law to the MTM Act, it 
would be helpful to look at the broader principles 
that should — and that actually do — underlie 
this area of law. First, when the government 
imposes tax or changes a tax, then that law, like all 
economic regulations, is subject to rational basis 
review.
Second, broad-based changes to tax systems 
should almost always be constitutional, at least 
regarding possible retroactivity concerns, despite 
their inevitable impact on taxpayer expectations. 
For instance, suppose the federal government 
instituted a value added tax. Such a change would 
have a big impact on those who have already 
retired on a fixed income and, for this reason, 
there should perhaps be transition relief. But if 
Congress opted to enact a value added tax 
without providing that relief — or not very much 
relief — then that would not render the tax reform 
unconstitutional because of the retroactive effects. 
Similarly, within the income tax, there is no 
requirement that the tax system provide for net 
operating loss deductions, much less that 
Congress cannot change those deductions. 
Indeed, the federal government did make NOLs 
less generous as part of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 
and California just capped the use of NOLs for 
two years in response to the current crisis. Again, 
although these sorts of tax law changes can 
undeniably have retroactive effects, these types of 
retroactive effects simply do not put the 
constitutionality of these sorts of tax law changes 
into question.
There are many further examples. Consider 
reforms that would treat capital gains the same as 
ordinary income, eliminate stepped-up basis at 
death, or even move toward full expensing for 
more business investments while limiting interest 
payment deductions (as many in the right-of-
center tax policy community advocate). All would 
retroactively affect many taxpayers. Nevertheless, 
assuming the changes satisfy rational basis, they 
should be constitutional. As noted, the law 
typically follows this principle — so cases 
4
For a prior write-up of a portion of our analysis, see Gamage, 
Emmanuel Saez, and Darien Shanske, “The NY Billionaire Mark-to-
Market Tax Act: Revenue, Economic, and Constitutional Analysis” (Dec. 
9, 2020).
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challenging these broad changes as 
unconstitutional are rare. Any rule to the contrary 
would make it difficult or impossible for 
Congress or state legislatures to reform the tax 
law.
Third, though broad changes to tax systems 
must be permitted as a general rule, there are 
instances of changes that appear more 
problematic. These are typically amendments to 
specific substantive rules that affect the tax 
treatment of completed transactions. These 
changes are typically challenged as violating due 
process rights as unduly retroactive.
These sorts of changes to substantive rules 
that raise more problematic retroactivity concerns 
can be distinguished from the broad-based 
changes discussed earlier by looking to whether 
the amendments in question affect tax returns 
filed in previous years.5 If a legal change affects a 
prior-year tax return in a manner that would 
require taxpayers to revise those returns, then this 
raises potentially troubling retroactivity concerns. 
By contrast, if a broad-based legal change has 
more nebulous retroactive effects that do not 
affect any prior-year tax returns and would not 
require taxpayers to revise those returns, then 
these effects generally do not raise 
constitutionality concerns. Again, this is because 
almost all major tax reforms create these sorts of 
more nebulous retroactive effects by altering the 
future consequences of taxpayers’ past actions. 
Taxpayers simply do not have general reliance 
interests against legislators reforming the tax law.
Fourth, there is no firm rule prohibiting the 
narrow class of truly retroactive statutes that do 
affect prior-year tax returns. The retroactivity of 
these statutes is itself subject to rationality review 
and in many cases is upheld. Thus, for example, 
when the statute is remedial and applies to 
transactions not overly remote in time, the statute 
should be — and is — upheld. The less a statute is 
remedial, the farther back it goes, and the more it 
unsettles reasonable expectations, the more likely 
it should be struck down.
II. The Key Case Law Precedents
As explained, we think the case law broadly 
follows our analytic structure and will discuss 
some key cases.
A. Early Income Tax Cases
The first income tax statute passed after 
ratification of the 16th Amendment was 
retroactive by 10 months and upheld by the U.S. 
Supreme Court from a due process challenge in 
Union Pacific Railroad.6 Taxpayers challenged the 
original income tax for taxing dividends 
themselves derived from earnings accumulated 
before there was an income tax. This challenge 
was rejected.7 Taxpayers challenged the 
retroactive application of a new tax on dividends 
imposed by Wisconsin in connection with the 
Great Depression. This challenge was rejected and 
resulted in the rightfully famous dictum from 
Justice Harlan F. Stone:
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on 
the taxpayer nor a liability which he 
assumes by contract. It is but a way of 
apportioning the cost of government 
among those who in some measure are 
privileged to enjoy its benefits and must 
bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys 
immunity from that burden, its retroactive 
imposition does not necessarily infringe 
due process, and to challenge the present 
tax it is not enough to point out that the 
taxable event, the receipt of income, 
antedated the statute.8
Thus, from the earlier period of the income 
tax, short retroactivity periods at the time of 
enactment were permissible. Further, claims that 
taxpayers had a vested right to the treatment of 
their economic activities accorded by a previous 
tax system were rejected.
5
We thank Susan Morse for this way of explaining the relevant 
doctrine.
6
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1, 10 (1916).
7
Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918).
8
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1938).
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B. Carlton
The leading modern Supreme Court case on 
retroactivity is Carlton, decided in 1994.9 The issue 
in Carlton was the constitutionality of an 
amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that 
Congress approved. As adopted in October 1986, 
IRC section 2057 granted an estate tax deduction 
for half the proceeds of “any sale of employer 
securities by the executor of an estate” to an 
employee stock ownership plan.
This provision did not limit the deduction to 
securities held by the decedent at the time of 
death. In December 1986, Carlton, acting as an 
executor, purchased shares in a corporation, sold 
them to that company’s ESOP at a loss, and 
claimed a large 2057 deduction on the decedent’s 
estate tax return. In December 1987, Congress 
amended section 2057 to provide that to qualify 
for the deduction, the securities sold to an ESOP 
must have been “directly owned” by the decedent 
“immediately before death.” The amendment 
applied retroactively, as if it were incorporated in 
the original 1986 provision. Carlton sued for the 
estate, arguing that the amendment’s retroactive 
application to his transactions violated the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The 
Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that this retroactive 
application was rendered unduly harsh and 
oppressive, and therefore unconstitutional, by 
Carlton’s lack of notice that section 2057 would be 
retroactively amended and by his reasonable 
reliance to his detriment on pre-amendment law.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, 
holding that the 1987 amendment’s retroactive 
application to Carlton’s 1986 transactions did not 
violate due process. First, the Court explained 
that “the ‘harsh and oppressive’ [test for 
retroactive taxation, derived from Welch v. 
Henry] . . . ‘does not differ from the prohibition 
against arbitrary and irrational legislation’ that 
applies generally to enactments in the sphere of 
economic policy.”10
The Court then explained that under the 
applicable standard, a tax statute’s retroactive 
application must only be supported by a 
legitimate legislative purpose furthered by 
rational means. The Court held that Congress’s 
purpose in enacting the 1987 amendment was 
neither illegitimate nor arbitrary: Section 2057 
was originally intended to create an incentive for 
stockholders to sell their companies to their 
employees, but the absence of a decedent stock 
ownership requirement resulted in the 
deduction’s broad availability to virtually any 
estate at an estimated loss to the government of 
up to $7 billion in anticipated revenues. Thus, the 
Court explained, Congress undoubtedly intended 
the amendment to correct what it reasonably 
viewed as a mistake in the original provision.
The Supreme Court stated that there was no 
plausible contention that Congress acted with an 
improper motive, and that its decision to prevent 
the unanticipated revenue loss by denying the 
deduction to those who made purely tax-
motivated stock transfers was not unreasonable. 
Moreover, the Court held, the amendment’s 
retroactive application was rationally related to its 
legitimate purpose, since Congress acted 
promptly in proposing the amendment within a 
few months of section 2057’s original enactment 
and established a modest retroactivity period that 
extended only slightly longer than one year. The 
Court held that the circuit court’s exclusive focus 
on the taxpayer’s notice and reliance held section 
2057 to an unduly strict standard.11
Returning to our analytic frame, the statute in 
question did narrowly amend the substantive tax 
law as to transactions completed in the past — 
unlike the broad changes to tax systems we 
canvassed in the earlier cases. Nevertheless, 
applying the rationality test to the retroactivity, 
and clearly considering the statute’s remedial 
nature, the Court found the statute permissible.
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote a 
concurrence for herself alone. She was concerned 
that the majority opinion could be read to give the 
government too much leeway. Her reasoning is 
important because it sets a kind of floor. 
O’Connor argued that:
A period of retroactivity longer than the year 
preceding the legislative session in which the 
law was enacted would raise, in my view, 
serious constitutional questions. But in 
9
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
10
Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted).
11
Id. at 35.
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keeping with Congress’s practice of 
limiting the retroactive effect of revenue 
measures (a practice that may reflect 
Congress’s sensitivity to the due process 
problems that would be raised by 
overreaching), the December 1987, 
amendment to 2057 was made retroactive 
only to October 1986. Given our 
precedents and the limited period of 
retroactivity, I concur in the judgment of 
the Court that applying the amended 
statute to respondent Carlton did not 
violate due process.12
Since Carlton, the Court has declined to revisit 
the retroactivity issue regarding state tax laws, 
despite repeated attempts to persuade it to do so.13 
In nontax contexts, the Court approved longer 
periods of retroactivity; for example, O’Connor 
herself approved a six-year retroactive law in 
General Motors in the context of employers’ 
obligations to pay workers’ compensation 
benefits.14
Other courts have approved much longer 
retroactivity periods. For example, in Tesoro 
Refining, a Washington appeals court held that an 
amendment to tax law with 24 years’ retroactive 
effect unconstitutional. The state supreme court 
reversed on grounds that the newly enacted law 
merely clarified preexisting law and thus was not 
a retroactive change at all.15
C. Subpart F and MTM cases
In response to policy concerns regarding 
evasion or more accurate measuring of income, 
Congress has added many provisions to the IRC 
that tax undistributed profits or economic income. 
Not surprisingly, given the earlier precedents 
permitting Congress to subject new types of 
income to tax, even income not previously taxed, 
taxpayer challenges to those provisions have been 
unsuccessful. For example, courts have approved 
of the foreign personal holding company regime, 
enacted in 1937 to tax the undistributed profits of 
foreign “incorporated pocketbooks” controlled by 
U.S. residents, and the subpart F regime (1962), 
which taxes specific undistributed income of 
controlled foreign corporations.16 Mark-to-market 
regimes in the IRC include sections 475 (MTM for 
securities dealers), 1256 (MTM for some 
contracts), and 1296 (elective MTM for publicly 
traded passive foreign investment companies). 
Only section 1256 was challenged on 
constitutional grounds, and the Ninth Circuit 
held that because the taxpayer could have 
realized his gains on any given day, MTM was 
constitutional.17
D. New York Case Law
The New York courts also apply the Carlton 
test, though the Court of Appeals has its own test 
for constitutionality under the due process clause 
of the state constitution.18 As to the New York test, 
courts look to three factors: (1) “the taxpayer’s 
forewarning of a change in the legislation and the 
reasonableness of . . . reliance on the old law,” (2) 
“the length of the retroactive period,” and (3) “the 
public purpose for retroactive application.”19
In a recent case applying retroactivity, the 
Court of Appeals considered legislation meant to 
correct a strained — but not wholly implausible 
12
Id. at 41 (emphasis added). Note, however, that Justice Antonin 
Scalia concurred as well and would apparently have approved unlimited 
retroactivity: “The reasoning the Court applies to uphold the statute in 
this case guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid. 
. . . I welcome this recognition that the Due Process Clause does not 
prevent retroactive taxes.”
13
See most recently Dot Foods Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 372 P.3d 
747 (Wash. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2156 (2017) and six consolidated 
cases from Michigan pertaining to the Multistate Tax Compact that were 
filed for 22 companies: Sonoco Products Co. v. Michigan Department of 
Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP 
v. Department of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Gillette Commercial 
Operations North America v. Department of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); 
International Business Machines Corp. v. Department of Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 
2157 (2017); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Department of Treasury, 137 S. 
Ct. 2157 (2017); and DIRECTV Group Holdings LLC v. Department of 
Treasury, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017). The petitions in the consolidated 
Michigan cases all derived from the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision 
in Gillette Commercial Operations North America v. Department of Treasury, 
878 N.W.2d 891 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015), rev. denied, 880 N.W.2d 230 (Mich. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017).
14
General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 (1992) (unanimous 
opinion by Justice O’Connor).
15
Tesoro Refining and Marketing Co. v. Department of Revenue, No. 
85556-1. (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2012).
16
See Eder v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 27 (2nd Cir. 1943) (upholding 
foreign personal holding company regime); Garlock Inc. v. Commissioner, 
489 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1973) (upholding subpart F).
17
Murphy v. United States, 992 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1993).
18
James Square Associates LP v. Mullen, 21 N.Y.3d 233, 247-48 (2013) 
(“An aggrieved taxpayer may choose to make a claim that a retroactive 
tax violates the Due Process Clause under the standards in United States 
v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 114 S.Ct. 2018, 129 L.Ed.2d 22 (1994) and our 
precedent in Replan.”).
19
Id. at 246, citing Matter of Replan Development v. Department of 
Housing Preservation and Development, 70 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1987).
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— reading of the New York state personal income 
tax that permitted taxpayers to avoid paying the 
tax on their sale of an S corporation that made an 
election under IRC 338(h)(10).20 The taxpayer-
friendly reading had persuaded two tax tribunals, 
occasioning the need for legislation.21 Despite the 
related lower court victories, the appellate court 
found that the taxpayer’s aggressive reading of 
the tax law was not reasonable given long-
standing understandings of the previous statute. 
The court further held that the Legislature’s 
curative purpose to be rational and a three-and-a-
half-year retroactivity period reflecting open tax 
years was not excessive — thus upholding the 
retroactive statute.
On the other side of the ledger, the Court of 
Appeals in 2013 found that retroactive changes to a 
tax credit program were not permissible. The court 
found that there was limited forewarning and too 
long a retroactive period even though the 
retroactive period was arguably only 16 months, 
but it was the third factor that was “dispositive” 
because “the legislature did not have an important 
public purpose to make the law retroactive. It was 
not attempting to correct an error in the tax code as 
in Carlton, or to prevent ‘the loss of [single-room-
occupancy] housing and to discourage the 
precipitous eviction of tenants’ as in Replan [a 
retroactivity case the state won]. . . . Retroactively 
denying tax credits to plaintiffs did nothing to spur 
investment, to create jobs, or to prevent prior abuse 
of the credit. The retroactive application of the 2009 
Amendments simply punished the Program 
participants more harshly for behavior that already 
occurred and that they could not alter.”22
New York constitutional common law 
therefore reflects the principle that retroactive 
revocation of specific benefits can be found 
unconstitutional, but there is more leeway when 
taxpayers do not have reasonable reliance or 
when the statute is curative.
E. Moore and the Transition Tax
Another recent example at the federal level 
was the transition tax imposed in 2017 on the 
accumulated offshore earnings of U.S.-based 
multinationals. The TCJA imposed a one-time tax 
at 8 percent on illiquid assets and 15.5 percent on 
liquid assets accumulated by the CFCs of U.S. 
multinational enterprises. This tax applied to 
earnings accumulated offshore between 1986 and 
2017, which amounted to over $3 trillion.
A district court recently rejected a 
constitutional challenge to the transition tax based 
on retroactivity.23 The government argued that the 
transition tax should not really be analyzed as 
retroactive at all so much as a change to a new tax 
system. The district court rejected this argument, 
but nonetheless upheld the tax under Carlton. 
First, the court reasoned that it was rational for 
Congress to transition to a territorial system and, 
as part of that transition, subject earnings to tax 
that were subject to tax under the previous system 
if distributed, but would otherwise never be taxed 
under the old system. The old system created an 
incentive for these earnings to accumulate abroad, 
which made the statute in part remedial. Given 
these reasonable purposes, choosing a retroactive 
period back to the last major tax overhaul (1986) 
was reasonable.
F. Assessment of the Cases
Generally, this survey of the case precedents 
— including New York case precedents — 
indicates that the current law governing 
retroactivity is broadly consistent with our 
normative prescription: There is no vested right in 
the tax system as such, including as to the 
realization requirement. Thus, the retroactive 
effects of broad-based tax law changes generally 
do not raise significant constitutional concerns, 
especially when no prior-year tax returns are 
affected. As to narrow tax law changes upon 
which there could have been specific reliance, 
short periods of retroactivity imposed within a 
year of the enactment of tax legislation are still 
generally permitted. By contrast, the retroactive 
revocation of specific tax benefits on which 
20
Note that the prospective application of the income tax to deemed 
assets sales under IRC section 338(h)(10) was challenged as, in effect, 
subjecting intangible property to an ad valorem property tax in violation 
of Article XVI, section 3 of the New York Constitution. That claim was 
rejected in Burton v. Department of Taxation and Finance, 25 N.Y.3d 732; 16 
N.Y.S.3d 215; 37 N.E.3d 718 (2015).
21
Caprio v. Department of Taxation and Finance, 25 N.Y.3d 744, 749; 37 
N.E.3d 707, 711 (2015).
22
James Square Associates, 21 N.Y.3d at 249-50; 993 N.E.2d 374, 383 
(2013).
23
See, e.g., Moore v. United States, Case No. C19-1539-JCC (W.D. Wash. 
2020).
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taxpayers reasonably relied and that require 
taxpayers to revise prior-year tax returns is 
generally disfavored, but may still be permitted 
— especially with a remedial purpose.
G. Application to the MTM Act
Where does the MTM Act stand in regard to 
retroactivity?
First, its residency provision falls squarely 
within even O’Connor’s criteria for permitted 
retroactivity, since the MTM Act applies only to 
2020 New York residents.
Second, as to the prospective shift to an MTM 
system, this is permissible because taxpayers have 
no vested rights in the prior tax system and this 
shift does not affect any prior-year tax returns.
Third, the taxation of previously accumulated 
gains in the first year should be permissible for the 
same reasons: This is just a deemed-sale 
mechanism that does not affect any prior-year tax 
returns, but only changes the rules for tax returns 
that will be filed for the 2020 tax year; those tax 
returns cannot be filed until 2021. (Some 
taxpayers may have already filed tax returns for 
2020 before its enactment, but assuming that the 
MTM Act is enacted before the end of 2021, this 
would just be a reasonable retroactive period of 
one year or less for 2020 tax returns.)
Alternatively, the constitutionality of the first 
year of the MTM Act tax can be analyzed by 
analogy with the transition tax. It is true that 
going forward, the New York measure would tax 
gain that occurred in that tax year, while the first-
year tax would tax gain that has occurred over 
many years. Yet, like the worldwide earnings that 
could have been taxed in Moore, the unrealized 
gains at issue here represent income that could 
have been taxed when it was earned.24 Further, 
also like the transition tax, New York can (and 
should) reasonably shift to MTM because, as with 
the old worldwide system, it incentivized 
deferral. The shift to MTM is thus remedial too. 
Further, and even better for the MTM transition, 
New York is transitioning toward taxing 
unrealized gains, hence not taxing these gains 
would result in an inequitable windfall that it can 
ill afford at the moment. Reducing increasing 
levels of inequality, equalizing treatment among 
the wealthy, and ending deferral to cope with an 
unprecedented emergency would all seem to 
count as important and rational purposes.
Given that the New York test follows that of 
the federal common law, New York courts might 
also just analyze the tax law under rational basis 
review as a general change to the tax system. 
Nevertheless, applying New York’s three-part 
test, we arrive at a similar result. First, in contrast 
to James Square Associates, in which after the 
taxpayer changed its behavior to obtain tax 
credits and the court held that the Legislature 
could not retroactively take them away, here there 
has been no such reliance on a realization rule: 
Taxpayers have already received the benefit of 
deferral and the Legislature would only be ending 
that going forward. Therefore, there is no reliance 
except on a static tax system, which is not 
reasonable.
Second, including all accumulated gains is 
necessary to achieve many of the statute’s 
important goals. Further, the 10-year deferral 
option at a reasonable rate of interest essentially 
means that the deferral is being included ratably. 
It is hard to characterize such a regime as “harsh 
and oppressive” for a billionaire, who is likely to 
still make money during the deferral. Third, as 
noted, the Legislature had important purposes in 
ending the deferral regime — one of which is 
remedial.
Tension between the first and third prongs 
also weighs in favor of constitutionality. Suppose 
the taxpayers strongly insist that they never 
expected to pay anything on their accumulated 
gains ever, and therefore that they had inadequate 
warning. That may be true, but there was no 
specific reliance — no change in behavior 
analogous to making investments to get a tax 
credit. Thus, we think this argument should be 
rejected as legally irrelevant but note that, to the 
extent it is true (that is, vast amounts of income 
were not going to be taxed under the old system), 
then that only strengthens the remedial purpose 
of the law.
III. Conclusion
If the New York MTM Act is enacted, some 
billionaires are likely to challenge it in court, but it 
24
This is why objections to the MTM Act based on New York 
constitutional prohibitions on wealth taxation are frivolous, because 
unrealized gains are income, not wealth.
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would almost certainly be upheld against any 
constitutional challenge based on retroactivity. In 
that case, it could be a model for other states and 
for the federal government if it seeks to move 
away from the outdated realization requirement, 
as U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., has proposed to 
do.25 
25
See U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, “Wyden Unveils Proposal to 
Fix Broken Tax Code, Equalize Treatment of Wages and Wealth, Protect 
Social Security,” Sept. 12, 2019.
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